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CML COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF BRONX: HOUSING PART K
BRONX PARK PHASE II PRESERVATION LLC

L&T Index No.: 040737/2018

Petitioner,
DECISION/ORDER
-againstBASIRU SIMAGA
Respondents,
Address:

2000 Valentine Avenue
Apt 615
Bronx, New York 10457

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219 (a), of the papers considered in review
of Respondent's Motion.

PAPERS
Respondent's Notice of Motion;
Attorney Affirmation; Affidavits in
Support; Memorandum of Law; &
Exhibits ("N' - "J")
Petitioner's Affirmation in Opposition
& Exhibits ("1" - "2")
Respondent's Memorandum of Law in
Reply

NUMBERED
1,2,3,4,5

6,7

8

Upon the foregoing cited. papers, th e Decision a.."1.d Order on Uespondent's !vfotiou is
as follows:
BACKGROUND
Bronx Park Phase II Preservation LLC ("Petitionei"') commenced the within
swnmary holdover proceeding against Basiru Simaga ("Respondent") seeking
possession of 2000 Valentine Avenue, Apartment 615, Bronx, New York 10457 ("the
subject premises") on the ground that the Respondent violated a substantial
obligatipn. of his tenancy. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that Respondent's lease
included a conditional limitation which provided for its early termination where the
Respondent failed to maintain his Section 8 benefits through the CVR New York
Westchester HCV Program. '!'he predicate notices and the facts contained therein
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assert that the Respondent triggered this conditional limitation when he was
terminated from the Section 8 Program.
Respondent, rep1·esented by counsel, moves to dismiss the instant proceeding
pursuant to CPLR § 3211 (a)(l) and (a)(7). Respondent asserts that this proceeding
should be dismissed as the grounds of this holdover proceeding have been cured. For
the reasons cited below, Respondent's motion is GRANTED.
DISCUSSION

a.

The General Standard on a CPLR § 3211 (a)(l) Motion

CPLR § 3211 (a)(l) permits dismissal of an action where "a defense is founded upon
documentary evidence." A motion to dismiss under CPLR § 3211(a)(l) may be
granted only where the documentary evidence utteriy refutes the factual allegations
contained in the pleadings: conclusively establishing a defense as a matter of law
(Goshen v Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 98 NY2d 314 [2002]). Documents that
have traditionally qualified for evidentiary consideration under CPLR § 3211(a)(l)
are those which ru·e a) unambiguous; b) of undeniable authenticity; a nd c) reflect
content that is essentially undeniable (VXI Lux Holdco S.A.R.L. v SIC Holdings,
Inc. 1 LLC, 171AD3d189 [1st Dept 2019); Bronxville Knolls v Webste1· Town Ctr.
Partnership, 221AD2d248 [1st Dept.1995) ; Koziatek v SJB Dev. Inc., 172 AD3d
1486 [3d Dept 2019]; Mehrhofv Mon1·oe-Woodbury Central School District, 168
AD3d 713 [2d Dept 2019]). "[J]udicial records, as well as documents reflecting outof-court transactions such as mortgages, deeds, contracts, and any other papers, the
contents of which are essentially undeniable, would qualify as documentary
eviden.ce in the proper case" (Magee-Boyle v Reliastar Life Ins. Co. of New York, 173
AD3d 1157 [2d Dept 2019]). Factual affidavits, however, do not constitute
documentary evidence within the meaning of the statute (Flowers v 73rd
Townhouse LLC, 99 AD3d 431 [1st Dept 2012)).
In considering the documents offered by the movant to negate the claims in a
complaint or petition, a court must adhere to the concept that the allegations in the
pleadings are presumed to be true, and that the pleading is entitled to all
reasonable inferences (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83 [1994)). However, while the
pleading is to be liberally construed, the court is not required to accept as true
factual allegations that are plainly contradicted by documentary evidence (Robinson
v Robinson, 303 AD2d 234 [1st Dept 2003)).

b.

Standard on a CPLR § 3211 (a)(7) Motion

The standard on a CPLR § 3211[a][7] motion is 'whether the proponent of the
pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one" (High De!mition
MRI, P.C. v Travelers Cos., Inc., 137 AD3d 602 [1st Dept 2016]). In its review, the
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court takes the facts as alleged in the pleadings as true and acco1·ds the plaintiff or
petitioner the benefit of every possible favorable inference (Leon v Martinez, 84
NY2d at 87-88; African Diaspora Mar. Corp. v Golden Gate Yacht Club, 109 AD3d
204 [1st Dept 2013]).
''In deciding such a pre-answer motion, the court is not authorized to assess the
relative merits of the [petition's] allegation against the [respondent's] contrary
assertions or to determine whether or not [petitioner] has produced evidence to
support his claims" (Salles v Chase Manhattan Bank, 300 AD2d 226, 228 [1st Dept
2002]). However, "allegations consisting of bare legal conclusions, as well as factual
claims flatly contradicted by documentary evidence are not'' presumed to be true or
acco1·ded every favorable inference (David v Hack, 97 AD3d 437, 438 [1st Dept
2012]), and the criterio"n becomes "whether the proponent of the pleading has a
cause of action, not whethe1· he has stated one" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 88
[1994]).
c.

The Law and Its Application

In the matter at bar, Respondent's Section 8 benefits from the CVR New York
Westchester HCV Program (hereinafter "CVR") were terminated in 2017.
Respondent now asserts in his moving papers that the eviction remedy herein
sought by the Petitioner does not lie since Respondent's Section 8 subsidy was
restored. Petitioner stands in opposition. Although Petitioner does not dispute the
fact that Respondent's Section 8 benefits were r estored, it asserts that the
Respondent has not cured all claims alleged in the Petitioner's notices since there is
approximately $3,655 outstanding in HAP arrears which accrued during the time
his Section 8 subsidy was terminated.
Since the documentary evidence establishes that the Respondent's section 8 subsidy
was reinstated, the Court dismisses the instant holdover proceeding (see 63-63
Pai·tners, L.P. v Paez, 63 Misc.3d 158 [A] [App Term 1st Dept 2019]; DU 1st Realty
Co. LP v Robinson, 35 Misc 3d 138[A] [App Term, 1st Dept 2012]).
This Court's recent decision in an unpublished case in the matter of Bronx Park
PliaseII Preservation, LLC v. Sakanoko, NYLJ, Feb. 20, 2020 at p.21, col.1 [Civ Ct,
Bronx County 2020) does not call for a different result. In that proceeding, the
landlord's predicate notices noted that the tenant's lease contained a conditional
limitation which provided for its early termination when the tenant lost its Section
8 subsidy. Those predicate notices, however, cited 24 CFR 982.310 (d)(1)(iv) as an
additional basis to terminate the tenancy. This provision of the federal regulations
permits a la ndlord to terminate a tenancy for good cause where there is "a business
or economic reason for termination of the tenancy." Although the tenant in that
proceeding similarly restored his Section 8 subsidy during the pendency of the
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proceeding, the Court declined to grant the tenant's motion pursuant to CPLR §
3211 and CPLR § 3212 by reasoning that the tenant only cured one of the two
claims in the predicate notices: the landlord had a remainjng claim under 24 CFR
982.310 (d)(l)(iv).
In Bronx Park Phase II Preservation, LLC v. Sakanoko, the claim under 24 CFR
982.310 (d)(l)(iv) was viable because the landlord suffered a significant economic
loss in the sum of $27,437 in unpaid HAP payments; the landlord could not recover
the unpaid subsidy from the PHA; the landlord was barred from collecting t he
unpaid Section 8 subsidy from the tenant due to federal regulations (24 CFR
982.310 [(b][l]); and a question remained as to whether the tenant engaged in
wrongful and/or purposeful acts that ultimately lead to the termination of his
benefits and th.a losS·Of his subsidy. Thus, in that proceeding, the landlord could yet
prove at trial that the tenant's actions lead to th e loss of the unpaid HAP payments;
that such actions provide "a business or economic reason for termination of the
tenancy"; and that the same warrant the remedy of eviction. The tenant, in turn,
had two options. Litigate the underlying claim under 24 CFR 982.310 (d)(l)(iv) and
challenge the assertion that he engaged in wrongful and/or purposeful acts. Or, in
the alternative, provide for a cure by paying the unpaid HAP payments even though
the t enant was not legally obligated to do so under the law.
In contrast, Petitioner failed to cite 24 CFR 982.310 (d)(l)(iv) as an additional basis
to terminate the tenancy herein. Therefore, given the above, Respondent's motion to
dismiss the instant proceeding is granted.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, those prongs of.Respondent's· motioi:i· seeking clismiSsal are GF-ANTED.
This constitutes the Decision/Order of this Court.

Dated:

Bronx, New York
March 23, 2020

C ?=---

HON. KRzyszTOF LACH
Judge, Housing Court
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